Publication
The right to remain silent in roman-type law doctrine : an economic perspective
| dc.contributor.author | Lang, Günther | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-02-11T15:41:25Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-02-11T15:41:25Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2005-09 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes the strategic implications of the existence of the right to silence in criminal trial in the context of Roman law doctrine. The right confers to the defendant the privilege that, in the context of a signalling game, i. e. the trial, no adverse conclusions may be drawn from his exercise of the right. It is shown that respect for the right to silence does not have significant strategic consequences. In particular, no influence on conviction rates exists, neither rightful nor wrongful ones. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.3/3308 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | por |
| dc.peerreviewed | yes | por |
| dc.publisher | CEEAplA | por |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Paper Series;05/2005 | |
| dc.subject | Miranda Right | en |
| dc.subject | Economic Analysis of Law | en |
| dc.subject | Right to Silence | en |
| dc.subject | Signalling Game | en |
| dc.title | The right to remain silent in roman-type law doctrine : an economic perspective | en |
| dc.type | working paper | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| oaire.citation.conferencePlace | Ponta Delgada, Açores | por |
| oaire.citation.title | Working Paper Series | en |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | por |
| rcaap.type | workingPaper | en |