Publication
The Miranda Right to silence in criminal trial : an economic analysis
| dc.contributor.author | Lang, Günther | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-02-11T16:06:13Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-02-11T16:06:13Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2005-09 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes the strategic implications for criminal trial of the existence of the famous Miranda Right to Silence in U.S. law doctrine. The right confers to the defendant the privilege that, in the context of a signalling game, i. e. the trial, no adverse conclusions may be drawn from his exercise of the right. It is shown that Miranda reduces wrongful confessions and convictions, at the price, however, of setting free guilty defendants as well. The rate of silence is affected only when confidence for the respect of the right is perfect; otherwise guilty defendants prefer to pool with innocent ones at declaring themselves innocent. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.3/3310 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | por |
| dc.peerreviewed | yes | por |
| dc.publisher | CEEAplA | por |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Paper Series;07/2005 | |
| dc.subject | Miranda Right | en |
| dc.subject | Right to Silence | en |
| dc.subject | Economic Analysis of Law | en |
| dc.subject | Signalling Game | en |
| dc.title | The Miranda Right to silence in criminal trial : an economic analysis | en |
| dc.type | working paper | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| oaire.citation.conferencePlace | Ponta Delgada, Açores | por |
| oaire.citation.title | Working Paper Series | en |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | por |
| rcaap.type | workingPaper | por |