Browsing by Author "Cabral, Ricardo"
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- Evaluating a mobile telecommunications merger in PortugalPublication . Andini, Corrado; Cabral, RicardoThis paper evaluates the impact of the proposed Optimus-TMN mobile telecommunications merger in Portugal. The results suggest that, if the merger would have taken place, the average market profit margin would have increased by 11.6 percentage points and the average market price would have increased by 3.8%. As a consequence, the average marginal cost would have decreased by 14.9%, and welfare would have increased by €163.3mn per year, a gain entirely captured by the producers. Moreover, the merger would have resulted in a large transfer of surplus from consumers to producers, to the tune of €99.5mn per year. The conclusion is that, while the merger could have been authorized on efficiency grounds, such authorization should have been accompanied by strict retail price-cap merger remedies.
- Monopoly behavior with learning effects and capacity constraintsPublication . Cabral, RicardoUsing a model motivated by the adoption of new process technology in the semiconductor industry, this paper analyzes dynamic monopoly behavior with endogenous learning-by-doing and capacity constraints. The analysis shows that the monopoly invests in learning early-on by producing at higher rates than the static optimum. In addition, it invests in more manufacturing capacity than the static optimum in order to be able to learn faster. Furthermore, in order to prevent prices from falling too rapidly it leaves some capacity idle as the technology matures and learning externalities becomes negligible. Finally, the monopoly may set price below marginal cost when demand is large or growing rapidly.
- A perspective on the symptoms and causes of the financial crisisPublication . Cabral, RicardoThis article identifies two paradoxes prior to the onset of the financial crisis: banking profits were at historically high levels despite the impending crisis; and though profits were high the profitability of financial intermediation was poor. Using a novel model of banking, it argues that large banks attained high profits through balance sheet expansion and growing mismatches between assets and liabilities. As a result, large banks’ financial leverage rose while their liquidity structure worsened, setting the conditions for a systemic banking crisis. Finally, this article argues that this conduct and performance was only possible due to misguided changes to the regulatory framework, specifically the Basel I Capital Accord and reductions in reserve requirements.
- Technology adoption deterrence through learning and capacity investmentPublication . Cabral, RicardoThis paper analyzes an incumbent’s use of learning and manufacturing capacity investment to deter or accommodate adoption of a new technology by a potential competitor, using a perfect state-space equilibrium concept and a model motivated by the semiconductor industry. The results indicate that, under typical market conditions, an incumbent leaves some capacity idle after learning-by-doing cost reductions have been achieved, and an incumbent that follows an accommodation strategy invests in more learning than a monopoly that does not face the threat of entry. Finally, the analysis suggests that investments in learning and manufacturing capacity allow early adopters to credibly alter strategies (and equilibria) of the adoption game in their favor vis-à-vis followers.
- A test of collusive behavior based on incentivesPublication . Cabral, RicardoThis paper proposes a novel collusion test based on the analysis of incentives faced by each firm in a colluding coalition. In fact, once collusion is in effect, each colluding firm faces the incentive to secretly deviate from the agreement, since it thereby increases its profits, although the colluding firms’ joint profit decreases. Thus, in a colluding coalition each firm has marginal revenues, calculated with Nash conjectures, which are larger than its marginal costs. The collusion test is based on the rejection of the null hypothesis that the firm marginal revenues with Nash conjectures are equal to or less than its marginal costs.